Cooperation and Allocation of Authority in the European Union

Abstract

European integration produces combinations of common rules, national administration and supranational decision-making within the same policy field. This article asks what explains the variation in the allocation of regulatory and supervisory authority between national and European institutions. It reviews delegation, historical institutionalism and bargaining scholarship to distinguish the feasibility of an institutional arrangement from the terms on which actors accept it. Authority interdependence serves as a provisional organising concept for relationships in which the political value and practical effectiveness of one governing power depend on control over connected functions. The analysis considers how retained powers and safeguards may make transfers acceptable, while preserving legal constraints, expertise and professional learning as alternative explanations. It then examines acute crisis and anticipatory pressure as overlapping conditions that may change delay costs, expectations and acceptable commitments. Digital finance illustrates the relevance of these relationships through the differentiated supervisory responsibilities established by the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and the Digital Operational Resilience Act. The central contribution is to specify the allocation question at the level of connected functions, rather than infer centralisation from common rules or European institutional participation. Whether particular controls operate as negotiated compensation remains an empirical question requiring evidence beyond the final institutional design.