Beyond the Veto: Qualified Majority and the EU’s Strategic Autonomy

Abstract

This paper analyses the institutional limits that condition the strategic autonomy of the European Union (EU), with particular attention to the areas of foreign and security policy. In a scenario marked by growing international tension—with the war in Ukraine, the resurgence of tensions in the Middle East and Donald Trump's return to the US presidency—the European Union is being forced to redefine its international role. This analysis focuses on the obstacles arising from the principle of unanimity, which slows down and conditions decision-making, and proposes the use of qualified majority voting as an alternative means of strengthening institutional effectiveness. From a legal-institutional perspective, the main instruments available to the EU, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are evaluated, assessing their actual scope and limitations. The study concludes that, without structural reform of the decision-making process accompanied by sustained political commitment, the EU will find it difficult to consolidate its position as a relevant strategic actor in a multipolar world order where autonomous decision-making capacity is at the core of power.